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Abstract
In this paper, I shall address the important role of the rule of law as an ideal of 
political morality. I will be outlining the virtues and limits of the rule of law. My 
central thesis is that the rule of law is crucial for the moral legitimacy of a politi-
cal system and for an open society, understood in the Popperian sense. Its limits, 
however, are similar to the limits of positive law in general. Ultimately, the virtues 
of the rule of law depend on the moral virtues of people and on the moral quality 
of positive law. In this respect, the benefits of the rule of law ultimately depend on 
natural moral law and its realization in human affairs.
Key words: rule of law, principle of legality, political morality, democracy, na-
tural law, philosophy of law
Introduction
The rule of law is an important ideal of political morality. However, it is only 
one among many ideals, such as respect for autonomy and human rights, social 
justice and welfare, economic freedom or democracy. For the sake of conceptual 
clarity, it may be helpful not to confuse the rule of law with these other more 
substantial ideals. In brief, the rule of law requires that political power and go-
vernment operate within the constraints of positive law, i.e. within the framework 
of a legal and constitutional system. Positive law is binding both for state autho-
rity and for the citizens who are to comply with it. It is my assumption that the 
current crisis of democracy in Europe has several causes. One aspect of this crisis 
may be identified with the rule of law crisis or its proper application, both in re-
gard to the EU as well as its member states.
In this short paper, I shall outline the virtues and limits of the rule of law.1 
The central thesis is that the rule of law is crucial for the moral legitimacy of a 
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1 To be sure, only persons can have “virtues” in the strict sense. My phrasing alludes to Raz, 2011a; 
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political system and for an open society, understood in the Popperian sense. Its 
limits, however, are similar to the limits of positive law in general. Ultimately, the 
virtues of the rule of law depend on the moral virtues of people and on the moral 
quality of positive law. In this sense, the benefits of the rule of law ultimately de-
pend on natural moral law and its realization in human affairs.
1. The Rule of Law and Its Virtues
1.1. No One is Above the Law
The rule of law means, quite literally, that the law should govern. The go-
vernment and administration should operate within the constraints of positive 
law, i.e. within the boundaries of a legal and constitutional system. Whether one 
is an official authority or a citizen, no one is above the law. Everyone is to comply 
with it and everyone is accountable to it: The law is the supreme authority. Histo-
rically seen, the rule of law is rooted in a centuries–long process of limiting and 
taming political power by positive law. One can qualify it as being the result of an 
emancipation movement and a struggle for political freedom. As an ideal of poli-
tical morality, it can be found to some extent already in the work of Aristotle. In 
legal history, the Magna Carta Libertatum of 1215 (“Great Charter of England”) 
has been a milestone. Many modern constitutions explicitly lay down the rule 
of law, for instance, the Austrian constitution of 1920. Art. 18 (1) B–VG states 
the so–called Legalitätsprinzip, i.e. the principle of legality, and says: »The entire 
public administration may be exercised only on the basis of laws.«2
1.2. Conditions for the Rule of Law
In characterizing the conditions for the rule of law, one can distinguish betwe-
en the formal, procedural and more substantial aspects (cf. Waldron, 2016). With 
regard to the formal aspects, Lon Fuller’s list of eight principles is still worth con-
sidering, namely, generality, publicity, prospectivity, intelligibility, practicability, 
consistency, stability and congruence (Fuller, 1969, 33–94). These principles are 
formal in the sense that they do not address the content of positive law. Never-
theless, Fuller regarded them as some sort of “inner morality of law”, i.e. moral 
values that are inherent in the structure of the legal system.
The generality of law means that there must be general rules — rather than 
ad–hoc decisions — so that people can comply with them. Without general rules, 
there can be no rule of law. As a purely formal principle, however, this requi-
rement does not guarantee justice. It is compatible with laws that are morally 
unfair. Publicity means that legal norms are to be promulgated in the proper way. 
Officials and citizens must have access to legal rules and know them such that 
the law will be able to guide human conduct. Similarly, no one can comply with 
2 »Die gesamte staatliche Verwaltung darf nur auf Grund der Gesetze ausgeübt werden.« My 
translation.
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a retroactive law because it does not exist at the time of action; hence, the im-
portance of prospectivity for the rule of law. Furthermore, people have to under-
stand the legal requirements, if they are to fulfil them. Laws have to be clear and 
intelligible. Practicability means that the law has to be enforceable and must not 
demand the impossible. The ethical principle “ought implies can” is valid already 
at this technical level. Legal norms that impose obligations which are beyond hu-
man capacity are simply pointless. Legal rules should also be relatively stable du-
ring time, for the stability of law is necessary in order to guide human behaviour 
in the long–term. Rules that change too frequently will be rather ineffective. In 
addition to the complex principle of congruence between official action and the 
declared rule, deontic consistency is also an important desideratum. The rule of 
law cannot work if there are contradictory requirements within a legal system.
As regards procedural aspects, the following requirements are important. In 
order to safeguard the universal validity of the rule of law, there must be legal 
norms that regulate the process of law–making and bind the legislator, for in-
stance, parliament. Those norms are typically laid down in the constitution, so 
it is only within the framework of a constitutional state, including independent 
constitutional jurisdiction, that the rule of law can be fully realized. Similarly, the-
re must be legal norms which regulate the application of laws by administrative 
authorities or courts. Discretion is not sufficient: there must be general laws that 
guide the making of particular laws. In this respect both types of legal norms are 
needed for the rule of law, namely, primary rules (rules of conduct) and secon-
dary rules (rules of empowerment) (Hart, 2012, 79–99). A system of checks and 
balances is important in order to control the rule of law. Furthermore, certain 
procedural rights must be guaranteed by the legal system — for instance, the right 
to a fair trial — so that the law can be enforced in an adequate way.
Frequently, the rule of law is associated with other more substantial require-
ments such as the safeguarding of human rights, the respect for private property 
and economic freedom, the promotion of social justice and welfare, and — last 
but not least — democracy. There is a continuum of “thin” and “thick” concepts 
of a state under the rule of law.3 It might certainly be difficult to draw a sharp 
line between the formal/procedural and the substantial aspects. However, for 
the sake of conceptual clarity it seems to me helpful, as already noted, not to 
confuse the rule of law with other ideals of political morality. Inflationary use 
of the concept also presents the danger of opening the gates for ideologies of all 
sorts or ending up with empty formulas. At any rate, even a formal/procedural 
understanding of the rule of law involves important moral implications. What 
are, then, the underlying moral values of the rule of law? Wherein lie its virtues?
1.3. Underlying Moral Values
The rule of law seeks to limit and restrain political power in the sense that the 
government and official authorities are themselves subject to the law. Political 
3 Tom Bingham (2011, 66–68) argues, against Raz, for a “thick concept”.
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measures and actions of the state have to be implemented by general, clear and 
relatively stable rules. Courts or other institutions supervise the making of these 
rules, as well as their application. Seen from this perspective, one of the most 
fundamental values of the rule of law is that it aims to minimize the exercise of 
arbitrary power and the damage that will inevitably arise from it. It is about the 
mitigation of damage and harm, which is morally relevant in a profound sense. 
In aiming to reduce arbitrariness and despotism, the rule of law can be seen as 
a principle that ensures a minimum of rationality or reasonableness within the 
political process. Following Georg Simmel, Fuller argued that the rule of law also 
establishes a bond of reciprocity between the ruler and the ruled since both are 
subject to the law: 
Government says to the citizen in effect, ‘These are the rules we expect you to follow. 
If you follow them, you have our assurance that they are the rules that will be applied 
to your conduct.’ When this bond of reciprocity is finally and completely ruptured by 
the government, nothing is left on which to ground the citizen’s duty to observe the 
rules (Fuller, 1969, 39–40).
In this sense, the rule of law also ensures a minimum of trust in the political 
system as well as adherence to it.
Within a state under the rule of law, people can rely on the fact that political 
action is bound to promulgated, prospective and relatively stable laws. Hence, 
politics becomes more predictable. One is able to foresee how the state will res-
pond to one’s own decisions and actions. This value of predictability is important 
in order to make long–term plans and to develop a scheme of life. On this view, 
the rule of law is, as Hayek pointed out, conducive to individual and economic 
freedom (Hayek, 1960). It is a genuine liberal principle. Arguably, free market 
economy and entrepreneurship cannot function without a certain standard of 
legality implied in the inherent meaning of the rule of law. Hence, the rule of law 
is also crucially important with regard to the economic system.
In this context of predictability and personal freedom, some authors, notably 
Joseph Raz, connect the rule of law — even in its formal understanding — with 
a certain degree of respect for human dignity. Raz argues that violating the rule 
of law and exercising power over people in an arbitrary manner frustrates the 
possibilities of long–term planning and rational agency. Hence, it neglects the 
fact that humans are persons in a moral sense. Says Raz:
A legal system which does in general observe the rule of law treats people as persons 
at least in the sense that it attempts to guide their behaviour by affecting the circum-
stances of their actions. It thus presupposes that they are rational autonomous crea-
tures and attempts to affect their actions and habits by affecting their deliberations 
(Raz, 2011b, 222). 
Raz is aware of the limited strength of his argument. A purely formal un-
derstanding of the rule of law is compatible with many forms of injustice and 
violations of human dignity, however, the prospects are getting slightly better, 
if one emphasizes the importance of procedural aspects, for instance, certain 
procedural rights like the right to a fair trial. Such rights presuppose that human 
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beings are capable of rational agency and accountability for their actions, and 
thus are persons in the moral sense.
1.4. The Rule of Law and an Open Society
The possibility of an open society depends on several conditions, and the rule 
of law is a very important one in this regard. Karl Popper developed his ideal of 
an open society by applying central tenets of critical rationalism to political phi-
losophy.4 Popper rejected the question “Who should rule?” as the fundamental 
question of political philosophy and replaced it by the question of institutional 
design: »How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent 
rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?« (Popper, 2011, 115). 
The crucial idea is to minimize the exercise of arbitrary power in order to pre-
vent damage, safeguard individual freedom and foster critical rationality for our 
attempts at problem solving. An open society is opposed to all forms of closed 
societies like tribal, collective or totalitarian societies. Given the persistent falli-
bility of human beings, it is necessary to divide political power in order to control 
it. Political decision–making processes must be transparent and open for correc-
tion and improvement. Hence, an open society requires that political institutions 
and their actions can be rationally criticised and reformed. To be sure, much 
more than the principle of legality is required, but it is difficult to see how an 
open society could be realized without the rule of law.
1.5. An Expression of Self–Legislation
In its formal understanding the rule of law, as such, does not imply democracy. 
However, within a democratic–participatory system, i.e. a system in which the po-
pulation is involved in the process of law–making, it ensures a certain degree of 
collective autonomy (“identity of ruler and ruled”) (cf. Habermas, 1998, 109–237). 
Here, the rule of law is an expression of self–legislation because executive autho-
4 As a contemporary philosophical movement, critical rationalism claims to be an alternative to 
both dogmatism and scepticism. There are different versions; however, one could identify three 
core components of critical rationalism: critical realism, comprehensive fallibilism and metho-
dological revisionism. Critical realism involves the ontological thesis that there is an objectively 
structured world, which exists independently of the human mind and our conceptual frameworks; 
and the epistemological thesis that this objectively structured world is in principle accessible to 
our cognitive powers, despite various possible limitations that are caused by the structure of our 
cognitive apparatus. Comprehensive fallibilism involves the thesis that human beings remain falli-
ble not only in their quest for knowledge but also in all other areas of problem–solving. There are 
no methods that could overcome this fallibility, for instance, we cannot obtain any justification 
of our beliefs whatsoever that would guarantee their truth. Methodological revisionism applies to 
the whole field of human problem–solving (including morality and ethics) and involves the thesis 
that all our theories and problem solutions are in principle revisable. We should not try to verify 
or “prove” them — for ultimate justification is illusory — but rather critically examine and check 
them against possible alternative solutions in order to assess their qualities. The emphasis is on 
criticism and refutation, not on justification or (inductivist) confirmation. Moreover, there are no 
(basic) beliefs that can be legitimately regarded as immune to rational criticism. See, for instance, 
as a brief summary: Albert, 2010, 391–392.
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rities are bound to democratically generated norms and may enforce only those 
laws that are democratically generated. The principle of legality accomplishes 
democracy in the sense that executive authorities are subordinate to parliament, 
which expresses, at least in theory, the will of the people. Moreover, the rule of 
law also confines parliamentary power, because legislative actions are regulated 
by constitutional provisions and controlled by constitutional jurisdiction.
The underlying values of the rule of law are of such significance that a poli-
tical system cannot claim moral legitimacy without a minimal degree of legality. 
Nonetheless, there are limits and pitfalls, too. What are, as it were, the “vices” 
of the rule of law?
2. The Rule of Law and Its Limits
2.1. Individual Cases and Concrete Circumstances
Most citizens, jurists and political philosophers, especially the liberal ones, 
are appreciative of the rule of law and its underlying values. However, criticism 
is also present. Prominent figures such as Plato, Hobbes and Carl Schmitt were 
opposed to the rule of law or, at least, to an exaggerated understanding of it. 
A general critique states that human and social affairs are not uniform; they 
are characterised by instability and uniqueness. The principle of legality, on the 
other hand, emphasises general aspects because of the requirement that gene-
ral and relatively stable laws must guide political and judicial decisions. Hence, 
the rule of law is conducive to disregarding individual cases and their concrete 
circumstances. From this point of view, the rule of law promotes the opposite 
of what it intends to do, namely the exercise of arbitrary power. Especially in 
a situation of crisis or emergency, a strict adherence to the rule of law can be 
disastrous because it impedes quick political response and paralyzes the state’s 
ability to act. Furthermore, it can lead to a problematic mentality of both citizens 
and political authorities, for instance, with respect to legalism and over–burea-
ucratized thinking which is unable or unwilling to criticise positive law from a 
moral point of view.5
Given these dangers and problems, much depends on a reasonable actualiza-
tion and application of the principle of legality. One needs to avoid two extremes, 
namely an overly loose conception of the rule of law on the one side, and an 
overly strict conception on the other side, i.e. a regulatory overkill. Drawing on 
a general legal–ethical maxim, one could say that the principle of legality has to 
be realized in a non–counterproductive way, i.e. in such a way that its underlying 
values are not undermined in the long run and on the whole. It is about a truly 
sustainable actualization of the rule of law. This applies to both law–making and 
the application of laws.
5 For further criticism, see, for example, Waldron, 2016.
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For example, in interpreting Art. 18 (1) B–VG, the Austrian Constitutional 
Court demands a “nuanced” or “differentiated” principle of legality (Öhlinger, 
1999, 243–250). In some areas of law, it requires more strictly determined legal 
rules and a stricter determination of administrative action than in others, taking 
into account the specific nature of the subject matter and the need for the legal 
protection of citizens. Strict determination is necessary primarily in areas with a 
strong relation to fundamental rights, for instance, in criminal law or expropria-
tion law. In other areas, a more flexible regulation is adequate. Legal regulations 
in the form of specified targets (“final programming”) are also considered to be 
compatible with the principle of legality, for example, in regional planning law. 
However, the vagueness of this “final programming” must be compensated by 
strict procedural rules. Taken as a whole, a proper functioning of the rule of law 
requires a high quality of legislation and law–making. Unfortunately, one can find 
many examples, i.e. laws, in which the corresponding quality standards are not 
sufficiently met, not even on a formal or technical level (cf. Fuller’s list of eight 
principles). This problem, in turn, contributes to a crisis of the rule of law and 
a crisis of democracy. Therefore, one measure to overcome this crisis would be 
to improve the quality of law–making as well as the quality of professional legal 
training (cf. Bussjäger, 1996).
Similar questions arise with regard to the application of laws. There is some 
controversy in regard to the role of discretion within the rule of law. Some authors, 
notably Dicey and Hayek, hold that official discretion is fundamentally opposed 
to the rule of law (Dicey, 1915; Hayek, 1944). In reality, discretion is inevitable 
because general rules are usually vague and underdetermined. However, within 
a state under the rule of law discretion cannot be “free” in the sense that officials 
may make decisions arbitrarily. To be sure, applying general laws, i.e. generating 
particular laws, is most often a creative activity and involves constructive aspects. 
However, this creative activity must be guided by the law in the sense that an 
official is bound by the meaning and purpose of those legal norms which must be 
applied or by certain legal principles. Hence, discretion always must be a “bound 
discretion” (cf. Reimer, 2016, 237–241).
2.2. Law Enforcement and Moral Attitudes
The rule of law cannot work if laws are not enforceable or are, in fact, not 
enforced. The state is in charge of law enforcement because it holds a monopoly 
on the use of force and must ensure legal certainty. On an international level, one 
can detect a lack of legality due to systemic deficiencies regarding the enforce-
ment of international law and also a lack of a clear monopoly on the use of force. 
Hence, the rule of law is not sufficiently realized in the international community 
of states.6 To a certain degree, this applies to the EU as well. Enforceability can 
be problematic, however, also within a nation–state. The lack of law enforce-
6 »If the daunting challenges now facing the world are to be overcome, it must be in important part 
through the medium of rules, internationally agreed, internationally implemented and, if nece-
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ment can have many reasons, of course: for example, institutional or economic 
reasons. In addition, one should not underestimate personal or moral attitudes. 
Both citizens and officials must acknowledge the authority of law, its values and 
the importance of law enforcement, without becoming subservient. There has 
to be a culture of compliance and public spirit within the population, a sort of 
Verfassungspatriotismus: “constitutional patriotism” (cf. Müller, 2010). In other 
words, the rule of law cannot function without certain moral and civic virtues, 
because, in the final analysis, human beings make the rule of law happen. Ulti-
mately, the virtues of the rule of law depend, at least in part, on the moral virtues 
of people. In a similar context, Ernst–Wolfgang Böckenförde (1967, 60) famously 
stated: »The liberal, secularized state lives by prerequisites which it cannot itself 
guarantee.«7
2.3. Unjust Laws, Natural Moral Law and the Christian Faith
At this point in our reflection, positive law refers to morality and moral stan-
dards. To be sure, the rule of law is an ideal of political morality. It is however, as 
already noted, a more or less formal/procedural one because it does not address 
the content of the laws. Without a minimal degree of legality, a political system 
cannot claim moral legitimacy. Yet, more is needed. There can be gravely unjust 
laws, even under the rule of law and within democracies. Obedience to such laws 
would not be a virtue, but rather a vice. The crucial question is, then: How is it 
possible to assess the moral quality of positive law? Seen from the perspective of 
moral objectivism, mere reference to factual consensus or conventional morality 
would not be sufficient. Conventional morality can be problematic, and there are 
diverse moral traditions, which partly contradict each other. Cultural relativism 
is not a viable option because it leads, in the final analysis, to dogmatism and 
violence (cf. Deinhammer, 2010). Perhaps the current crisis of democracy and 
the rule of law in Europe indicates, to some extent, an even more fundamental 
crisis, namely a crisis of reasonable morality and confusion regarding objective 
moral standards.
From my point of view, a recovery of the natural law tradition could contribute 
to overcoming this crisis.8 Natural law thinking is deeply rooted in the philo-
sophical, theological and legal tradition of (not only) Europe. It draws on the 
plausible intuition that the way we should live and act as human beings has to 
have something to do with the way we are as human beings. The moral good is 
seen as related to or somehow grounded in human nature. Historically seen, the-
ssary, internationally enforced. That is what the rule of law requires in the international order« 
(Bingham, 2016, 129).
7 »Der freiheitliche, säkularisierte Staat lebt von Voraussetzungen, die er selbst nicht garantieren 
kann.« My translation.
8  One can notice a marked resurgence of interest in natural law ethics within contemporary philo-
sophical debates, especially in the English–speaking world. Some important contributions: Devi-
ne, 2000; Finnis, 2011; Foot, 2001; Gomez–Lobo, 2002; Hill, 2016; Hittinger, 1989; Lisska, 1996; 
MacIntyre, 1999; McInerny, 2012; Oderberg, 2000.
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re is a range of different versions of natural law ethics. The author conceives of 
natural law ethics as a type of normative ethics that exhibits at least the following 
four characteristics: (a) Natural law ethics involves moral objectivism and argues 
that the natural moral law and its principles provide criteria for assessing the 
moral quality of human actions and related phenomena (like legal norms). (b) 
Natural law ethics correlates the idea of moral goodness with our human nature 
and presupposes (minimal) metaphysical and anthropological essentialism. (c) 
Natural law ethics holds that moral principles can be identified by natural reason, 
i.e. without appealing to supernatural revelation, however, (d) natural law ethics 
is open to a theistic worldview and typically analyses the relationship between 
morality and religion.
I have made the case for a critical natural law theory as a kind of normative 
ethics that attempts to reconcile the legitimate concerns of the Aristotelian–Tho-
mistic natural law tradition with contemporary philosophical insights, especially 
with the insights of critical rationalism (Deinhammer, 2016; Knauer, 2002). The 
crucial idea of this approach is that morally right action is reasonable in the sense 
that it does not undermine, in the long run and on the whole, those values that 
the agents want to pursue by performing it. Morally right action is truly sustaina-
ble, seen from a universal or unfettered point of view.
Whenever we act, we act sub ratione boni,9 i.e. we desire something that is 
good or at least appears to be good (in a pre–moral or ontic sense) and which 
corresponds to our human nature. The way we are as humans constitutes the 
spectrum of things or states of affairs which are important and beneficial for 
us, which fulfil our needs, or which are irrelevant or harmful and destructive. In 
other words: if we had a different nature, including different dispositions, other 
things would be beneficial or harmful to us, that is to say, other things would be 
desirable for us. In this sense, our common human nature, which is admittedly 
interpreted to some extent in the light of “cultural factors”, constitutes basic hu-
man goods or values. However, the most important question in normative ethics 
is not “Which values should we pursue?” but rather “How should we pursue the 
values that we have decided to strive for?” Acting morally wrong is, in the final 
analysis, destructive and displays a negative overall balance with regard to the 
very value(s) that one is striving for. Such ways of acting are ultimately self–de-
feating or counter–productive, which is also the case if one unnecessarily sacri-
fices other values. For instance, one can pursue wealth in such a way that other 
people are excluded from participating in this value so that wealth is ultimately 
undermined.
In applying this approach to legal ethics, one could argue that its master prin-
ciple is able to provide convincing and universally valid criteria for an ethical 
evaluation of positive law and for providing criteria for its improvement. No-
netheless, these criteria may remain hypothetical, i.e. do not have to be ultima-
9  Cf. Thomas Aquinas, STh I–II q8 a1; I–II q94 a2; I q19 a9; I–II q78 a1; Raz, 2011a, 59–84. — It 
is impossible to desire an evil as such.
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tely justified. For instance, if legal norms are universally seen as counter–produc-
tive with regard to their goals (i.e. the goals of the lawmaker) or if legal norms 
command universally seen counter–productive actions (in the above sense), they 
can be evaluated as morally problematic. Similar to conventional morality, posi-
tive law can be characterised as an instrument for solving certain social problems 
(cf. Albert, 2000, 57–76). Based on this view, we may assess the moral quality 
of legal problem solutions in various ways, especially in the light of our master 
principle and thus propose better alternatives.
For example, in organising communal life and solving social problems, a po-
litician may emphasise different (incommensurable) values, for instance, either 
freedom or (social) security. However, he or she must not act counterproduc-
tively or sacrifice unnecessarily other values in pursuing freedom or security. 
Freedom without sufficient security will be self–destructive, and social security 
without sufficient personal and economic freedom is unsustainable also. The ide-
al would be to combine a maximum of freedom with a maximum of (social) secu-
rity. A restriction of freedom is only acceptable if this is truly necessary in order 
to safeguard and foster freedom in the long run and on the whole, i.e. related to 
the overall context and from a universal point of view. Hence, using force is only 
permissible in order to minimize the use of force in the final analysis. This is an 
important criterion of legitimate authority and legitimate use of force. Obviou-
sly, it is closely connected to the rule of law and its spirit. The rule of law is itself 
required by natural moral law.
Regarding the role of the Christian faith in morality and our moral life, I would 
argue that natural moral law is not a possible content of divine revelation, i.e. 
not a possible object of faith, because supernatural divine revelation can only 
be understood as God’s self–communication to the world. Natural moral law 
and its principles can be identified already by natural reason. However, faith as 
ultimate trust in God and his self–communication in Jesus Christ could be seen 
as liberation for the fulfillment of this natural law and the performance of truly 
good actions. By this faith, human beings are liberated from the power of a fear 
for themselves which is rooted in their vulnerability and impermanence, and, 
which is also the deepest cause of selfishness and inhumane behaviour. Hence, 
the Christian faith empowers human beings to perform good actions guided by 
morally right motivation, i.e. to do what is morally good precisely because it is 
good (cf. Deinhammer, 2017).
Conclusion
To sum up, the rule of law is crucial for the moral legitimacy of a political 
system and for an open society. Its limits, however, are similar to the limits of 
positive law in general. Ultimately, the virtues of the rule of law depend on the 
moral virtues of people and on the moral quality of positive law. In this sense, the 
benefits of the rule of law ultimately depend on natural moral law and its reali-
zation in human affairs.
43
Obnovljeni život, 2019, 74(1), 33–44 R. Deinhammer, The Rule of Law...
Bibliography:
Albert, Hans (2000). Kritischer Rationalismus: Vier Kapitel zur Kritik illusionären Denkens. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Albert, Hans (2010). Kritischer Rationalismus und christlicher Glaube. In Guiseppe 
Franco (Ed.), Sentieri aperti della ragione: Verità metodo scienza: Scritti in onore Dario 
Antiseri nel suo 70 compleanno (pp. 391–401). Lecce: Pensa Editore.
Bingham, Tom (2011). The Rule of Law. London: Penguin Books.
Böckenförde, Ernst–Wolfgang (1967). Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit: Studien zur Staatstheo-
rie und zum Verfassungsrecht. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
Bussjäger, Peter (1996). Der Rückzug des Rechts aus dem Gesetzesstaat. Wien: Verlag 
Österreich.
Deinhammer, Robert (2010). Menschenrechte und Kulturrelativismus. Archiv für 
Rechts— und Sozialphilosophie, 96, pp. 121–135.
Deinhammer, Robert (2016). Can Natural Law Ethics be Tenable Today? Towards a Cri-
tical Natural Law Theory. The Heythrop Journal, doi: 10.1111/heyj.12345, to be prin-
ted. (Version of record online, 5 july, early view.)
Deinhammer, Robert (2017). Das Verhältnis von Moral und Religion. Ethica, 25(3), pp. 
195–208.
Devine, Philip E. (2000). Natural Law Ethics. London: Greenwood Press.
Dicey, Albert Venn (⁸1915). Introduction to the Study of the Law of Constitution. London: 
McMillan and Co.
Finnis, John (²2011). Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Oxford University.
Foot, Philippa (2001). Natural Goodness. Oxford: Oxford University.
Fuller, Lon L. (²1969). The Morality of Law. London: Yale University.
Gomez–Lobo, Alfonso (2002). Morality and the Human Goods: An Introduction to Natural 
Law Ethics. Washington, DC: Georgetown University.
Habermas, Jürgen (1998). Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts 
und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus (³2012), The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University.
Hayek, Friedrich August von (1944). The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago.
Hayek, Friedrich August von (1960). The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of 
Chicago.
Hill, John Lawrence (2016). After the Natural Law. San Francisco: Ignatius.
Hittinger, Russel (1989). Critique of the New Natural Law Theory. Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame.
Knauer, Peter (2002). Handlungsnetze: Über das Grundprinzip der Ethik. Frankfurt a. M.: 
BoD.
Lisska, Anthony J. (1996). Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytical Reconstruction. 
Oxford: Clarendon.
MacIntyre, Alasdair (1999). Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the 
Virtues. London: Duckworth.
McInerny, Ralph (2012). Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice. Washington: 
The Catholic University of America.
Müller, Jan–Werner (2010). Verfassungspatriotismus. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
Oderberg, David S. (2000). Moral Theory: A Non–Consequentialist Approach. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
R. Deinhammer, The Rule of Law... Obnovljeni život, 2019, 74(1), 33–44
44
Öhlinger, Theo (⁴1999). Verfassungsrecht. Wien: WUV.
Raimund Popper, Karl Raimund (2011). The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: 
Routledge.
Raz, Joseph (2011a). From Normativity to Responsibility. New York: Oxford University.
Raz, Joseph (²2011b). The Rule of Law and Its Virtue. In: The Authority of Law (pp. 
210–229). Oxford: Oxford University.
Reimer, Franz (2016). Juristische Methodenlehre. Baden–Baden: Nomos.
Thomas Aquinas (1988). Summa theologiae. Milano: Editiones Paulinae.
Waldron, Jeremy (2016). The Rule of Law. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/rule–
of–law/ (accessed 22.08.2018)
Vladavina prava: vrline i granice
Robert Deinhammer*
Sažetak
U članku autor govori o važnosti uloge vladavine prava kao ideal političkog morala 
te opisuje vrline i granice vladavine prava. Središnja je teza da je vladavina prava 
vrlo važna za moralni legitimitet političkog sustava, kao i za otvoreno društvo, u 
popperijnskom smislu. Međutim, njegove granice općenito su nalik na granice pozi-
tivnog prava. Konačno, vrline vladavine prava ovise o moralnim vrlinama ljudi i o 
moralnim kvalitetama pozitivnog prava. U tom smislu, korisnost vladavine prava 
u konačnici ovisi o prirodnom moralnom pravu i o njegovu ostvarenju u ljudskim 
zbivanjima.
Ključne riječi: vladavina prava, načelo legalnosti, politički moral, demokracija, 
prirodno pravo, filozofija prava
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